

CHAPTER XVIII

THE LANDING AT SUVLA

(Map 3; Sketch A)

Experience shows me that, in an affair depending upon vigour and dispatch, the Generals should settle their plan of operations so that no time may be lost in idle debate and consultations when the sword should be drawn; that pushing on smartly is the road to success, and more particularly so in an affair of this nature; that nothing is to be reckoned an obstacle to your undertaking which is not found really so upon trial; that in war something must be allowed to chance and fortune, seeing it is in its nature hazardous and an option of difficulties.—WOLFE.

SINCE the Argive host set sail for the Trojan shore no stranger 6 Aug. collection of ships can ever have crossed the Ægean than that Map 3. which converged on Suvla on the night of the 6th August Sketch 1915. Here, in the first echelon, densely packed with over ten A. thousand men, were ten destroyers, each with a motor-lighter towing alongside and a picket-boat towing astern. Following behind were sloops and North Sea trawlers, with strings of life-boats and barges. Here were ocean-going liners, cross-Channel cargo-boats and Isle of Man paddle-steamers. And here were cruisers and monitors, hospital ships and steam yachts, cable ships and balloon ships, and drifters and Thames tugs.

It was just after 9.30 P.M. when, in pitch darkness, the destroyers and lighters carrying the 32nd and 33rd Brigades and 11th Division headquarters to B Beach, swung into line abreast and felt their way to the shore. About 500 yards out the seven destroyers stopped. Their anchors were eased down; and with every man's pulse beating a wild tattoo, the lighters made for the beach. Not a sound came from the land. Fleecy clouds hid the stars. A slight breeze ruffled the quiet sea.

At this beach the prevailing conditions were ideal. The beach was undefended. The lighters grounded within a few feet of the water's edge; their ramps were lowered on to dry sand; and from all seven lighters the troops poured ashore two abreast exactly in accordance with the plan. By ten o'clock four

6 Aug. battalions had landed without a casualty,¹ and the lighters were returning to the destroyers for their second loads.

The two battalions on the right were the 7/South Staffordshire (Lieut.-Colonel A. H. S. Daukes) and the 9/Sherwood Foresters (Lieut.-Colonel L. A. Bosanquet) of the 33rd Brigade. Their task was to entrench a line from the sea coast to the edge of the Salt Lake to protect the right flank of the landing-place. This they completed without trouble; the only Turks encountered were a couple of men about half a mile inland, who fired their rifles and fled as the troops advanced.

The two battalions on the left were the 6/Yorkshire (Lieut.-Colonel E. H. Chapman) and the 9/West Yorkshire (Lieut.-Colonel J. O'B. Minogue) of the 32nd Brigade. Colonel Minogue was in charge of both battalions till the arrival of the brigadier. Colonel Chapman was to detach one company of the 6/Yorkshire to piquet the southern edge of the Salt Lake, and another to clear the small knolls near Nibrunesi Point; and his two remaining companies, under Major A. Roberts, were to push straight forward to assault Lala Baba, closely supported by the 9/West Yorkshire. This done, both battalions were to advance along the spit between the Salt Lake and the bay, and join the 34th Brigade from A Beach at Hill 10.

The assault of Lala Baba by two companies of the 6/Yorkshire has more than a local significance. It was the first attack made by any unit of the New Army in the Great War, and it was carried out in circumstances that would have tried the mettle of highly experienced troops.

In common with all units of the division the 6/Yorkshire had already passed a very tiring day. The battalion had been on an instructional parade soon after daybreak. Then had followed normal routine duties; and it was nearly midday before company commanders first learnt of their imminent departure for the peninsula. A commanding officer's conference was held at 2.30 P.M., when maps of Suvla were issued. Soon afterwards the battalion marched down to the Leach in the burning afternoon sun and embarked on its lighters at half past six. The voyage across from Imbros had been a prolonged nervous strain. It was now ten o'clock. The men had been on their feet for seventeen hours; and the night was so black that it was only possible to see a few yards ahead.

The two companies to lead the assault were the first to land. They were still sorting themselves out on the beach when a burst of rifle fire from the left caused a few casualties and a certain amount of confusion. But order was quickly restored,

¹ A single shot from the shore had killed one naval rating on a lighter.

and even before the third company was ashore the first two ^{6 Aug.} had started for Lala Baba. The rounded top of the hill was faintly visible against the northern sky.

A few moments later the third company, under Major W. B. Shannon, was heading for Nibrunesi Point; and Colonel Chapman, having directed his fourth company towards the Salt Lake, was hurrying forward with his adjutant, his sergeant-major and the battalion medical officer to join the leading troops. Somewhere on the left front the Turks were keeping up a desultory fire, but their bullets were flying high. Suddenly a red flare shot up from Lala Baba: the main garrison was aroused.

The assaulting troops had been warned that bayonets only were to be used till after daybreak. Pressing forward in line, the two leading companies soon came under a hot fire, and officers and men fell thickly; but the line trudged on till the top of the hill was won. Most of the Turks scattered. But some lay low in their deep narrow trenches till the attacking troops had passed, and then sprang up to shoot them in the back.

With the hill captured, the way was now open for the advance towards Hill 10. But Major Roberts and all his officers, except two junior subalterns, had fallen, and at least a third of the men. Colonel Chapman's party, following behind, had stumbled into some Turks, and the Colonel had been killed and the rest of his party wounded. There was as yet no sign of the 9/West Yorkshire, which was still some way behind. Badly shaken at last, with all their leaders gone, with no one left to urge them forward, and not a notion of what was expected of them, the remainder of these two leading companies flung themselves down and waited.

Meanwhile Major Shannon's company, having dealt with two Turkish posts near Nibrunesi Point, was hurrying towards Lala Baba to join in the main advance. Breasting the south-western slopes of the hill, this company in turn came under a hot fire. Here a number of Turks were still holding out, and one of Shannon's subalterns was killed and the other wounded before they were driven back. Reaching the top of the hill, Shannon rallied the two leading companies of the battalion, and learnt that he and two junior subalterns were the only officers left.

Leaving one officer and a party of men to round up any Turks still left on Lala Baba, Shannon now led on down the northern slopes to a point not far from the spit, where he found and occupied an empty trench. He then sent a message to the brigadier, reporting the capture of the hill and giving

6/7 Aug. his present position.¹ Soon after midnight a party of the 11/Manchester (34th Brigade), which had landed in Suvla Bay, approached Shannon's post from the north, and reported that their brigade was only beginning to land. Then, about half past twelve, the 9/West Yorkshire appeared from the direction of Lala Baba, and took up a position on the right of the 6/Yorkshire.

Apart from the heavy losses of the 6/Yorkshire, all had gone well with the landing at B Beach. Br.-General Haggard was advancing on Lala Baba with the remaining two battalions of the 32nd Brigade. Br.-General Maxwell, in divisional reserve with two battalions of the 33rd Brigade, was preparing to follow. The divisional signal company, the pioneer battalion and three field companies were safely ashore, and the mountain artillery brigade and a battery of 18-pdrs. were getting ready to land. But the high-water mark of success had already been reached, and the tide was on the turn.

According to the prescribed plan, both Yorkshire battalions should now have pushed on towards Hill 10, to join, and if necessary assist, the 34th Brigade. But it was only too clear that something had gone wrong with the landing of that brigade. There was a good deal of firing in front; and, in order to avoid the risk of a clash in the dark with General Sitwell's troops, Colonel Minogue, in charge of the two battalions, decided not to advance. One officer's patrol was sent out to get into touch with General Sitwell; but the officer was shot, and the patrol fell back with nothing done. For the next two hours no further effort was made to clear up the situation in front, or to push forward beyond the line reached by Major Shannon before midnight. Darkness and uncertainty had once again paralysed initiative, and the advantages gained by the successful landing at B Beach were slowly ebbing away.

6 Aug. Meanwhile the 34th Brigade had indeed met with misfortune, and the navy's reluctance to attempt a landing inside the bay had been only too well justified.

All was quiet when shortly after 9.30 P.M. General Sitwell's brigade entered Suvla Bay in its flotilla of three destroyers

¹ This message, sent off before midnight, did not reach the brigadier: the runner was killed on his way back to the beach. After daylight the runner's body was found, and the message, still in his hand, was taken to divisional headquarters. It was not, however, intelligible. The writer had torn out from his note-book, in mistake for the first page of the message, a page of rough notes, jotted down the previous afternoon, on the verbal orders he had received for his action after landing.

(*Beagle*, *Grampus* and *Bulldog*) and three motor-lighters. So 6 Aug. dark was the night, however, that the destroyers could see nothing. Suddenly a flare on Lala Baba pierced the darkness, and a beacon shot up on the northern side of the bay. The Turks were alarmed before the landing had begun.

It was half past ten when the destroyers at last anchored about 600 yards from the shore, and the lighters were cast off. Almost immediately a scattered fire came from the land, and a small gun opened with shrapnel.

The lighter from the *Grampus* carried three companies of the 11/Manchester, who had been told they would land on the extreme left of A Beach, and were then to turn left-handed and clear Suvla Point and the Kiretch Tepe ridge. The lighters from the *Beagle* held three companies of the 9/Lancashire Fusiliers. These were intended to land on the right, and to push straight ahead to capture Hill 10. The *Bulldog's* lighter, which was to make for the centre of the beach, held one company of each battalion and the two battalion headquarters.

It was now discovered that, owing to the darkness, or perhaps to some lack of co-ordination of the naval and military plans,¹ the *Grampus* had anchored to starboard, or south, and the *Beagle* to port, or north, of the *Bulldog*, instead of *vice versa*. The three Manchester companies would therefore reach the shore on the extreme right of the beach instead of in their intended position on the left, and the Lancashire Fusiliers would find themselves on the left instead of on the right.

In the actual circumstances this proved a minor inconvenience. Infinitely more serious was the fact, not as yet appreciated, that the destroyers had anchored nearly 1,000 yards south of their intended anchorage, and that the lighters were heading, not for A Beach, but for that very part of the coast about 200 yards south of the Cut where shoal water was suspected.

The difficulties encountered by the 34th Brigade at this landing were in such sharp contrast to the easy conditions met with at B that in fairness to the units concerned the tale of them must be set down in detail. The plan for the brigade's action that night miscarried almost completely; but this failure was in no way the fault of the troops, whose bearing was unimpeachable in exceptionally trying circumstances.

The lighter from the *Grampus* managed to land her men without much trouble, and by 11.30 P.M. was back again with

¹ In point of fact the only written naval order on the subject was that the *Grampus's* station in Imbros harbour was to be west of the *Bulldog*, and the *Beagle's* station to the eastward, and that their formation while steaming to Suvla was to be "line ahead."

6/7 Aug. her destroyer to embark the second load. The other two lighters were far less fortunate. About 50 yards from the beach they struck a reef, and after vain efforts to get them off again, the troops had to lower themselves over the side and struggle ashore through water up to their necks. This experience, trying enough in daylight in time of peace; had to be undergone in pitch darkness, by heavily equipped men, in face of hostile fire. Some of the men found themselves out of their depth, and ropes had to be taken ashore in small boats to show the easiest route. It was after midnight before these lighters were cleared, and all this time a scattered fire, which fortunately did little damage, was coming from inland.


When the troops were at last formed up on the beach, the fact that they had landed at the wrong spot was a source of further delay. The leading company of the Lancashire Fusiliers, pushing straight inland to attack Hill 10, found itself on the edge of the Salt Lake, with no sign of its objective. About one o'clock, however, this company was led northwards across the Cut, followed a little later by 1½ companies in support. Lieut.-Colonel H. M. Welstead, commanding the battalion, established his headquarters just south of the Cut, and kept his last six platoons in battalion reserve.

Neither at this moment nor at any time before daybreak was the Turkish fire incessant on this part of the front. It consisted mostly of disconcerting sniping at close range and from every direction. In such circumstances the easiest targets must always be just those persons whom a battalion can least afford to lose—those natural leaders who make themselves conspicuous as they move about to encourage and exhort their men. And so it happened that in their first few hours ashore the two leading battalions were crippled by a disproportionate loss of their officers and best N.C.O.'s.¹

Fire was also coming from the direction of Lala Baba, and soon after midnight, when all four companies of the 11/Manchester had been collected under the battalion commander (Lieut.-Colonel B. A. Wright), one company was sent off in that direction to protect the right flank. It was the commander of this company who, as already noticed, established touch with the 6/Yorkshire on the northern slope of the hill. The remainder of the battalion moved along the beach in compliance with the original orders.

Favoured by the darkness, and by the fact that their path along the water's edge was well defined, the 11/Manchester

¹ The 9/Lancashire Fusiliers lost 60 per cent of its officers and 20 per cent of its rank and file before noon on the 7th August.



WHERE THE 34TH BRIGADE LANDED IN SUVLA BAY

made good progress round the bay, and the first part of its 7 Aug. journey was unopposed. Two small posts on the northern horn of the bay were rushed by a detached company, and about two o'clock, just as the moon began to rise, the whole battalion¹ began to climb the Kiretch Tepe ridge. Here a Turkish piquet, falling slowly back to its main position, offered a stout resistance. The going was difficult, and a number of casualties were suffered. But the advance went on doggedly, and by 3 A.M. a position had been gained about two miles east of Suvla Point. Well led by its officers, and with a well-defined objective, this single battalion had done splendid work.

Elsewhere, however, owing to the fatal decision to land a brigade inside the bay, and not to attack the Chocolate Hills from the south-west, the whole scheme for a rapid advance inland was already ruined. At 3 A.M. Br.-General Sitwell and his remaining two battalions of the 34th Brigade² had not yet landed. The Lancashire Fusiliers had not yet captured Hill 10, or even located it. Half of the companies which had gone forward two hours earlier was lying down a little to the north of the Cut and only a few yards from the beach, facing east. The other half, also to the north of the Cut, was lined out facing north. These two parties were not in touch; both were under fire, and both were suffering casualties. The waning moon was rising, and the increasing light was helping the Turkish marksmen, for the white armlets worn by the British were offering a good target.

The remaining six platoons of Fusiliers were still with Colonel Welstead. Here too the Turkish snipers were active, and Welstead himself had been slightly wounded. A second bullet killed him two hours later. There was no news of the 32nd Brigade; and for the moment, apart from his own six platoons, which he was holding in reserve to protect the beach, Colonel Welstead had no other troops to throw into the fight. In point of fact, no less than six battalions³ were at this moment sitting idle on Lala Baba within a mile of him. But no one in authority had yet realized the vital importance of pushing on with at least a portion of these troops now that something had obviously gone wrong with the 34th Brigade.

Out in the bay a long chapter of accidents was delaying 6 Aug. Sitwell's landing. One of the three lighters had got back to its destroyer (the *Grampus*) a little after 11.30 P.M. But on its second journey, with three companies of the 8/Northumberland

¹ Major H. C. Bates's company had now rejoined from the right flank.

² The 8/Northumberland Fusiliers and 5/Dorset.

³ The 32nd Brigade and two battalions of the 33rd Brigade.

7 Aug. Fusiliers, it struck a reef a long way out from the beach, and the spare tows of cutters had to be sent for to put the men ashore. The two drifters with these tows could not at first be found, and picket-boats had to scour the bay in search of them.¹ As a result, the 8/Northumberland Fusiliers did not begin to land till after three o'clock.

The *Bulldog's* lighter could not be refloated till half past one, and did not get back to her destroyer till after 2 A.M. She had some dead on her from the first trip, and several wounded. The dead were transferred to the destroyer; but, to save time, the wounded were left on board, and at half past two she started on her second trip with General Sitwell and brigade headquarters, one company each of the 5/Dorset and the 8/Northumberland Fusiliers, and the headquarters of these two battalions.

A hundred yards from the shore this lighter again struck a reef. It was impossible to land troops except in small boats, and very few boats could be obtained. The lighter came under considerable fire; many casualties were suffered on deck; and it was after daylight (4.30 A.M.) before the last of the 500 passengers had been dribbled ashore.

The delay in landing *Beagle's* complement—three companies of the Dorsets—was even worse. The *Beagle's* lighter had stuck so fast on the rocks that she could not be refloated at all. At one o'clock, after waiting in vain for her return, the captain of the *Beagle* asked the *Grampus*, which had now got rid of all her own troops, to fetch another lighter from B Beach. But it was not till 3.40 A.M. (only twenty minutes before the first glimmer of daylight) that the *Grampus* returned with a motor-lighter and a few small boats and that the landing of the Dorset companies was at last able to begin. Throughout these delays the small gun inland had continued to shell the bay, though luckily without doing damage.

Br.-General Sitwell and his brigade-major (Major L. F. Ashburn) landed in a small boat from the *Bulldog's* lighter about half past three and were soon in touch with Colonel Welstead. From him they learnt that Hill 10 was still uncaptured, and that no one knew exactly where it was. At that moment a

¹ In pursuance of the stultifying policy of excessive secrecy the officer in charge of these two drifters (Lieut. H. F. Minchin, R.N.) had been told no detail of the plan till just before the destroyers sailed from Imbros. He was then told "to follow the destroyers to Suvla and to remain near 'A Beach'". But his drifters could not keep up with the destroyers, and he soon lost sight of them in the dark. The coast was strange to him; he did not know where A Beach was; and his only guide was a small chart of the Eastern Mediterranean which fortunately marked Suvla Point.

number of men of the Lancashire Fusiliers came rushing back 7 Aug. to the beach, followed by a party of Turks. The Turks were stopped by some troops who had just landed, but the situation was plainly serious. Apart from Welstead's small reserve of Lancashire Fusiliers there were no troops in hand. The Manchesters had disappeared into the night and nothing was known of their movements. The other two battalions of the brigade were only now beginning to come ashore. It would be broad daylight in less than an hour, and large transports would be due to enter the bay. Yet the beach was still under rifle fire, and nothing had yet been done to secure it for the landing of troops and guns.

It was obviously imperative to make another attempt to locate and capture the redoubt on Hill 10. A few men of the 32nd Brigade had now arrived from Lala Baba, and on learning from them that Br.-General Haggard was at the top of the hill, Sitwell sent Major Gordon¹ to ask that officer to reinforce him with at least one battalion. Gordon was to explain the situation to Haggard, and then to find and report to divisional headquarters.

Help was actually nearer at this moment than Sitwell realized, for soon after 3 A.M. Haggard had sent on about four companies to assist him. But the senior officer with these troops, finding, on arrival at the spit, that Sitwell's units were still landing there, had told his men to lie down till the brigade in front was clear.

Pending the arrival of help from Lala Baba, Sitwell decided that an attempt to capture Hill 10 should be made by the six remaining platoons of the Lancashire Fusiliers under Major C. O. Ibbetson. Day was just breaking, and a large sand-dune could be faintly discerned to the north of the Cut. In point of fact, this hillock was not Hill 10, but a smaller mound about 400 yards farther south. It was mistaken for Hill 10, however, by Sitwell's brigade-major, and that officer pointed it out to Ibbetson.

A few minutes later Major Ibbetson charged and captured this hillock; but on reaching the top he came under fire from the real Hill 10, now visible to his north. Fire was also coming from an intervening trench about 200 yards away. Ibbetson made for this trench and captured it, but he himself was now wounded and could do nothing more.

Meanwhile, in rear, the four companies which General Haggard had sent on from Lala Baba had been thrown into the

¹ Major W. F. L. Gordon, of the 11th Division staff, had gone ashore with Sitwell as liaison officer.

7 Aug. fight. But each party had been led forward by its own officers, with little idea of what it was to do, and in each case the advance had petered out. On the extreme right a flanking movement by a mixed detachment under Major Shannon had momentarily promised better; but Shannon was soon badly wounded, and here, too, the attack came to nothing.

It was now broad daylight, and the situation in Suvla Bay was verging on chaos. The beach was still under persistent rifle fire, and two or three Turkish guns were dividing their attention between the troops already ashore and the large number of vessels crowding into the bay. The greater part of Sitwell's brigade had at last succeeded in landing. But the last company of the 5/Dorset from the *Beagle* was still coming ashore from a lighter when the Turkish fire became so heavy that the landing had to be suspended. The lighter, with 120 men still on board, was taken round to B Beach, and these men were lost to their unit till the morning of the following day.

Thus, by 5 A.M., instead of the 11th Division being established on all the surrounding hills, the only success achieved had been the capture of the two horns of the bay. The situation at that hour may be recapitulated as follows. Two battalions of the 33rd Brigade, detached under divisional headquarters, were occupying a line from the Salt Lake to the sea. The other two battalions of that brigade, which formed the divisional reserve, three field companies, and the pioneer battalion, were on or near Lala Baba, and there, too, was Br.-General Haggard with more than half of the 32nd Brigade. The eight mountain guns and the battery of 18-pdrs. were also in the neighbourhood of Lala Baba.¹ Farther to the north, near the Cut, were the Northumberland Fusiliers (Lieut.-Colonel C. E. Fishbourne) and the 5/Dorset (Lieut.-Colonel C. C. Hannay) of the 34th Brigade, just preparing to advance. Among the sand-dunes to the north of them were scattered parties of the 9/Lancashire Fusiliers and the four companies of the 32nd Brigade which had pushed forward to help them. Farther north again, and entirely out of touch, the 11/Manchester was pressing slowly forward along the Kiretch Tepe ridge.

Of all these troops the 6/Yorkshire, the 9/Lancashire Fusiliers and the 11/Manchester had alone been seriously engaged. The other two battalions of the 34th Brigade had been through trying experiences, but seven of the battalions on and south of Lala Baba had not yet been in action. Little of

- The field battery was ready for action just before 6 A.M.

the situation was as yet known at 11th Division headquarters, 7 Aug. and nothing of it by the corps commander.

Major-General Hammersley and the divisional staff had landed at B Beach about 12.45 A.M., and established their headquarters on a small mound a little way inland. The general, who had been feeling the climate severely, was by that time rather exhausted.

It was evident from the absence of firing in front that Lala Baba had fallen; so a little later headquarters were moved to another site about five hundred yards from the top of the hill. Runners had been sent out to find brigades, but for a long time none returned, and no news was received till after day-break. Then, at 4.40 A.M., a message at last came in:

The Ridge. 7th. 32nd Brigade holds Lala Baba. W. Yorks on right. Yorks and West Ridings on ridge. York & Lancs. in hollow behind ridge in reserve.

But it had not been signed; the time of its despatch was not mentioned; and it was not addressed to anybody.

A few minutes later, Major Gordon arrived with a personal account of the situation at A Beach and Lala Baba, and at the same moment a message from General Haggard reported¹ that Sitwell was still held up, and that one battalion of the 32nd Brigade had gone forward to help him. General Hammersley thereupon ordered a step which, had it been taken three hours earlier, might have saved the situation. He bade Haggard hurry forward with all his troops to assist Sitwell's advance. Haggard replied at 5.20 A.M. that he was carrying out this order.

H.M.S. *Jonquil*, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Christian, and with General Stopford and his General Staff on board, anchored soon after midnight just inside the mouth of Suvla Bay. A crackle of rifle fire could be heard from the direction of Hill 10; an occasional shell was bursting somewhere near A Beach; and a beacon was burning on Ghazi Baba. But otherwise all seemed to be quiet on shore.

On the way across Admiral Christian had confided to one of his officers that General Stopford had little hope of success and did not consider the scheme really feasible. The unexpected quietness of the situation seems, however, to have allayed

¹ A telephone wire had been run out from divisional headquarters to Lala Baba.

7 Aug. this anxiety. "Very little firing having been heard on shore," wrote the admiral in his official report a week later, "it was assumed that the force had landed unopposed." Mattresses were brought up on deck, and the admiral and the general turned in under the bridge to get what sleep they could. No news came from the land, no officer was sent ashore to establish communication with General Hammersley, and no report was forwarded to G.H.Q.

The first news to reach the *Jonquil* was brought about 4 A.M. by Commander Unwin, in charge of the motor-lighters. Having finished the landing at B Beach, that officer went round to Suvla Bay about three o'clock and found so much confusion that he hurried back to one of the monitors and asked her captain to come into the bay and hearten the troops by firing over their heads. This the captain refused to do without orders from Admiral Christian, and it was in search of these orders that Unwin had come to the *Jonquil*. To the admiral and the corps commander he reported the little he knew of the situation ashore.

Day was now beginning to dawn, and the admiral told Unwin to carry on with the landing of the six battalions which had just begun to arrive from Mitylene. But the point first to be decided was where this landing was to take place. It was plainly impracticable to use A Beach, and the rest of the bay had not yet been reconnoitred. Pending this decision a boat was sent across to the Mitylene flotilla to fetch the brigadier.

6 Aug. At General Headquarters every care had been taken to ensure communication throughout the night with the commander of the IX Corps and the troops of the 11th Division. The *Jonquil* was in wireless communication with Imros, and the cable ship *Levant* was to follow the flotilla of destroyers from Imbros harbour, and to land the shore end of her cable at Nicomedi Point as soon as the 32nd Brigade had secured the beach. The Imbros end of the cable was connected to a clock-faced dial in the signals tent at G.H.Q., and from 10 P.M. onwards the face of that dial had been watched with tense anxiety. The first movement of its needle would show that the troops were ashore.

Hour after hour the needle remained motionless. Hour after hour no message came from the *Jonquil*; and the Commander-in-Chief, restlessly pacing backwards and forwards from his own tent in search of news, could only be told that none had yet arrived.

Suddenly, about two o'clock, the needle began to swing, and,

amidst almost unbearable excitement, the telegraphist spelt out 7 Aug. its first message from the shore:

A little shelling at A has now ceased. All quiet at B.

That was all. It was not an official report, but a private message from the Suvla operator to his mate. But the tension was broken. The landing had been made good!

For the rest of the night no other report came from Suvla, and the Suvla telegraphist, constantly pestered for news, could only repeat that the firing seemed to have ceased, but that he knew nothing and had been given no messages for despatch. This negative news seemed, however, to imply that all was well with the IX Corps. It created a firm, though false, impression of success, and from that moment the attention of G.H.Q. was transferred to Anzac, whence the news was vaguely alarming. Many hours were to pass before the continued silence of the IX Corps began to arouse an uneasy suspicion that, despite the apparent ease of the landing, affairs at Suvla were not progressing well.

On the Turkish side, soon after 6 A.M. Liman von Sanders received a concise account of the night's happening:

7.8.15. 6 A.M.

1. The enemy landed at Nibrunesi Point about 9.30 P.M. last night. Outpost company evacuated Lala Baha in face of superior forces, and has joined the 1/31st Infantry Regiment at Chocolate Hill. The Kiretch Tepe—Chocolate Hill position is firmly in our hands.

2. Covered by numerous men-of-war the disembarkation of hostile forces continues.

3. Am holding the positions as ordered, but urgently request reinforcements.

WILLMER.